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VOLUME 50 SPRING, 1997 NUMBER 1
ON BALANCING SCALES, KALEIDOSCOPES, AND
THE BLURRED LIMITS OF ACADEMIC FREEDOM
HARRY F. TEPKER, JR.* & JOSEPH HARROZ, JR.**
L Introduction
When must a professor's academic freedom yield to a public university's interests
as an employer and its own academic autonomy? Apart from considerations of
pedagogy and prudence, this issue involves a balance of a professor's First
Amendment rights to research, to speak, and to publish with a public university's
duty and mission to provide higher education to the citizenry. The United States
Supreme Court has held that a "particularized balancing" is appropriate,' but its
analytical construct is a patchwork that fails to provide reasonable guidance to
federal district and appellate courts. The result is that both professors and
institutions of higher education are uncertain of their rights and obligations in this
area.
This article argues that institutional academic autonomy rests on independent First
Amendment interests that often justify reasonable, professional regulation of
professors' speech. Constitutional doctrine should more carefully and more precisely
distinguish between when a professor's academic freedom is paramount, and when
the professor's interests must yield to the duties of the college or university. Part
II defines "academic freedom" and discusses the parameters of the concept. Part Im
tracks the evolution of the current Supreme Court analysis in this area and identifies
the most recent permutation of the test for First Amendment protection of public
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employee speech in the workplace. Part IV, through an examination of two recent
cases, illustrates the confusion created by the Supreme Court's decisions. Part V
offers an alternative approach to "particularized balancing" in pursuit of a more
useful, more reliable constitutional test for benefit of both professors and
institutions.
II. Academic Freedom and Its Limits
As applied to academic employments, federal law is influenced, though not
controlled, by tradition that courts should be "alert against intrusion ... into th[e]
constitutionally protected domain" of "academic teaching-freedom and its corollary
learning-freedom."' The federal courts have often expressed a constitutional faith
that this nation ought to be "deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom,
which is of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers
concerned."3
A professor's academic freedom is often divided into three conceptual parts:
freedom to teach, freedom to research, and freedom to publish opinions on issues
of public concern.4 Judges, lawyers, and academics have offered many justifications
for academic freedom, but a utilitarian theme dominates. "Academic freedom...
is rooted.., in the recognition that '[i]nstitutions of higher education are conducted
for the common good... [which] depends upon the free search for truth and its
free exposition."'5
In many ways, academic freedom is a distinctly American idea.' In contrast to
the German ideas of academic freedom,
[t]he American theorists focused almost exclusively on the freedom of
the individual teacher and researcher ... In the American theory, ...
the autonomy of an the institution as a self-governing entity of
faculty... was largely neglected. Because American institutions were
2. Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959).
3. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
4. See Walter P. Metzrer, The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1990, at 8-9. It is possible, however, to see academic freedom in more
complex terms:
And though most ... divide academic freedom ... into three main parts, some insist that
good logic would divide it into only two (freedom to teach and freedom to do research,
arguably the only professionally relevant freedoms, with citizen or extramural freedom
ceded to the large neighboring country of ordinary civil liberties), and a few would divide
it into four (the three that go with the faculty's roles plus one attached to the students'
status) or even five (all of the four individual academic freedoms, along with institutional
academic freedom, also known as institutional autonomy).
Id. (footnotes omitted).
5. Michael A. Olivas, Reflections on ProfessorialAcademic Freedom: Second Thoughts on the Third
"Essential Freedom", 45 STAN. L. REV. 1835, 1835 (1993) (quoting ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE:
1940 STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND 1970 INTERPRETIVE COMMENTS, reprinted in AM. ASS'N OF UNIV.
PROFESSORS, POLICY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 3 (6th ed. 1989)) (alterations and third omission in
original).
6. See Matthew W. Firin, On "Institutional"Academic Freedom, 61 TEX. L. REv. 817, 821 (1983).
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not self-governing entities of faculty, the freedom expressly claimed by
American scholars was not autonomy for the institution, but a freedom
from the institution's own duly constituted lay governing authority!
Perhaps as a natural consequence of focusing on individual rights, professorial
freedom was linked with the First Amendment. Indeed, the phrase "academic
freedom" is often used as little more than a short-hand phrase to refer to First
Amendment rights of free expression as applied to professors, colleges, and
universities.8
The First Amendment influence is evident in the fact that a claim premised on
academic freedom is weak, if the aggrieved party cannot show that government
sought to punish or penalize speech;9 or sought to impose a prior restraint on the
advocacy of doctrine,"° on the expression of any theory, or on the search for any
information; or sought to restrict any creative or artistic activity." The courts take
care to look for governmental action that represents arf "express or implied
command" that faculty conform to any ideology, philosophy, creed, or point of
view." In this sense, the concept of academic freedom refers to constitutional and
nonconstitutional legal principles barring governmental interference with a
professor's academic speech, as well as a professor's right to speak and publish
controversial opinions in public discourse. 3 Two classic cases illustrate the point.
In Sweezy v. New Hampshire,4 the United States Supreme Court found "an
invasion of [a lecturer's] liberties in the areas of academic freedom and political
expression."" The investigations of the state attorney general into alleged
subversive activities were an ideological crusade that attempted to compel an
academician to disclose his political views, his political associations, and the content
of his classroom lectures. In Keyishian v. Board of Regents,6 New York statutes
7. Id. at 828 (emphasis omitted).
8. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) ("The right of freedom of speech
and press includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to receive,
the right to read and fieedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to teach - indeed the
freedom of the entire university community.") (citations omitted); Gray v. Board of Higher Education,
692 F.2d 901,909 (2d Cir. 1982) ("'[A]cademic freedom' is a concept fashioned from other constitutional
rights, including First Amendment and due process rights of faculty to avoid censure for the views they
teach and espouse.").
9. See University of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 184, 197-98 & n.6 (1990).
10. See id. (University's claim of academic freedom violation is weak in part because there was no
allegation that challenged government action was "intended to or will in fact direct the content of
university discourse toward or away from particular subjects or points of view.").
11. See id. at 199-200.
12. See id. at 201 ("[IThe First Amendment does not invalidate every incidental burdening of the
press that may result from enforcement of... statutes of general applicability.") (citing and quoting
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682 (1972)); see also Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681 (enforcement of
subpoena did not impose "prior restraint on what the press may publish, and no express or implied
command that the press publish what it prefers to withhold").
13. See University of Pa., 493 U.S. at 197.
14. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
15. Id. at 250.
16. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
19971
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required removal of tee.chers who made "treasonable or seditious" statements.'7 The
justices concluded that the New York laws created a program to "cast a pall of
orthodoxy over the classroom."' The Court added that "the uncertainty [of the
statute's] proscriptions [made] it a highly efficient in terrorem mechanism."' 9 New
York law "stifle[d] 'that free play of the spirit which all teachers ought especially
to cultivate and practice . . . ."' Both cases sought to protect "the intellectual life
of a university,"2' from a state government's efforts to suppress free expression.
These two cases reflect the pattern of First Amendment doctrine, which embodies
an enduring and persistent judicial hostility toward viewpoint discrimination.'
Nevertheless, the First Amendment roots of academic freedom can be overem-
phasized. Though the Supreme Court has characterized academic freedom as a
"special concern" of the First Amendment,' "[t]he concepts of free speech and
academic freedom are symmetrical and overlapping, not synonymous."' One
commentator has decried
an annoying tendency ... to treat academic freedom as arising full
blown out of the first amendment, like Athena out of Zeus' head ....
[T]he idea of academic freedom does not arise from the Constitution in
the first instance, nor does it depend upon the courts for its existence.
The law of academic freedom involves less the creation of novel first
amendment arguments than the more subtle (and as yet imperfectly
realized) process of constitutional assimilation of an older, largely
nonconstitutional idea.'
The problem of distinguishing academic freedom from other First Amendment
concepts is compounded by the fact that while the Supreme Court has indicated that
First Amendment rights are especially important for academic institutions, the
justices have not suggested that they are different for academics and academic
institutions. In particular, the justices have not suggested that the First Amendment
protects academics to a greater degree than other citizens. In the words of one
commentator:
17. See id. at 597.
18. Id. at 603.
19. Id. at 601.
20. Id. (quoting Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
21. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 261 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
22. See Rosenberger v. University of Va., 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST 111-12 (1980); see also infra notes 213-45 and accompanying text.
23. See Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603.
24. Olivas, supra note 5, at 1838; see also WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE, THE SPECIFIC THEORY OF
ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND THE GENERAL ISSUE OF CIVIL LIBERTY, reprinted in THE CONCEPT OF
ACADEMIC FREEDOM 59, 61-63 (Edmund L. Pincoffs ed., 1972).
25. Finkin, supra note 6, at 841 n.94 (1983); see also Walter P. Metzger, Profession and
Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic Freedom in America, 66 TEx. L. REV. 1265 (1988)
(distinguishing between professional conceptions of academic freedom and constitutional protections for
academic freedom).
[Vol. 50:1
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Who is entitled to the protections of academic freedom? The AAUP has
answered: 'every academic and no one but an academic.' The answers
courts have discovered in the Constitution concede little to the
profession's claim of comprehensiveness and nothing to its claim of
exclusiveness.'
The idea that academic institutions are entitled to broader, stronger, or better First
Amendment rights than the rest of the nation is inconsistent with this Court's
rejection of special First Amendment privileges for other institutions dedicated to
expressive activity.!7
To the extent that academic freedom is defined and defended not as an extension
of constitutional freedom of speech but as a form of professional autonomy,
problems emerge. First, it is not clear why professors deserve more professional
freedom than lawyers, doctors, nurses, or many others. The claim of the individual
professor to personal autonomy is not easy to distinguish from a claim of profes-
sional autonomy that might be asserted by many other professionals.
The problem is that the equation of academic freedom with a broad
conception of professionalism releases academic freedom from its
conceptual moorings. The engineer at NASA, the physician at a public
hospital, and the accountant in the state budget office have equally
plausible claims to such a distended version of academic freedom,
though they are not working in the academy.
Is there a constitutional right to embrace an assertedly superior
educational philosophy or are we left only with recent yuppie theories
of free speech, the assertion that expression promotes self-realization?
If so, why do not engineers at NASA have the constitutional right to
engineer rockets in the most efficient, productive and self-realizing
manner - even if their managers and the Congress disagree with them?
To be sure, professors speak and write for a living and engineers
conceptualize problems and design solutions (a form of communication)
but why should that matter? So too, hot tubs, home ownership, and
football games, sometimes, may also promote self- realization; but
constitutional entitlements to those aspects of the good life have yet to
be established.'
On the other hand, defining the concept of academic freedom as a precept of
professional autonomy can result in less, not more, protection. Early formulations
of academic freedom conceded as much. The American Association of University
26. Metzger, supra note 25, at 1295.
27. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 682-85 (1972) (the press does not enjoy immunity from
laws of general applicability or special access to proceedings or information withheld from the public).
28. Mark G. Yudof, Intramural Musings on Academic Freedom: A Reply to Professor Finkin, 66
TEx. L. REV. 1351, 1354-55 (1988) (footnote omitted); see also Mark G. Yudof, Three Faces of
Academic Freedom, 32 LoY. L. REV. 831, 834-35 (1987) [hereinafter Yudoff, Three Faces].
29. Yudof, Three Faces, supra note 28, at 840.
1997]
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Professors (AAUP) is a preeminent exponent of academic freedom, and its policy
statements are basic source documents essential to understand the claim of academic
freedom, and its limits. The AAUP's 1915 Declaration defined academic freedom
for professors, but it also articulated reciprocal professional obligations." A
professor was to respect institutional norms and standards, enforceable by faculty
peer evaluations. ]Faculty judgments about peers were to be overridden by
administration or governing bodies only when impartial professorial review
procedures and norms were not employed.3'
The AAUP's 1940 Statement continues the emphasis on a link between
professional autonomy and professional responsibility. The Statement defines an
academic freedom that is more limited than rights of the ordinary citizen. "The
teacher is entitled to fieedom in the classroom in discussing [his or her] subject,
but ... should be careful not to introduce into [his or her] teaching controversial
matter which has no relation to [his or her] subject."32 A standard of materiality
or relevance arises from a balance struck between expressive liberty and profes-
sional duties, not from the intrinsic meaning of free speech. Some formulations of
academic freedom are difficult to understand because they embrace incompatible or
inconsistent principles. For example, according to the AAUP, when the professor
speaks or writes as a citizen, he or she "should be free from institutional censorship
or discipline, but [his or her] special position in the community imposes special
obligations."33 Specifically, the professor "should at all times be accurate, should
exercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opinions of others, and
should make every effort to indicate that [they are] not... institutional spokes-
men.
34
If older cases suggested, often in dicta, that professors ought to enjoy "nearly
absolute autonomy ... under traditional academic freedom norms," 35 more recent
cases "indicate that teaching styles and methodologies may be open to greater
scrutiny"' by academic employers. In short, at one point it appeared that law
"carved out a majestic cordon sanitaire around college classroom instruction as
against institutional interference, protecting professors from governmental
intrusion."3 But though the underlying foundations of academic freedom seemed
to presuppose an "exceptional vocational freedom, '38 the arguments for such
freedom generally conceded that academics were to pay a price for such freedom.
30. See GENERAL REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND ACADEMIC TENURE
(1915), reprinted in LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Sunmer 1990, at 393 app.
31. See id. at 402-06.
32. ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE: 1940 STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES AND 1970 INTERPRETIVE
COMMENTS, reprinted in AM. ASS'N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS, POLiCY DOCUMENTS & REPORTS 3 (6th ed.
1989).
33. Id. at 4.
34. Id.
35. Olivas, supra note 5, at 1840.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 24, at 76.
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Academics owed a duty of "exceptional care in the representation of [the truth as
they view it], a professional standard of care."39 In short, the most prominent
advocates of strong legal protection for academic freedom conceded a professor
ought to be responsible, and subject to appropriate and proportionate discipline from
academic colleagues, if guilty of careless teaching or misrepresentations in the
dissemination of information or ideas in the classroom. 4
Needless to say, unless academics' concessions to "special obligations" are merely
aspirational, advisory, and unenforceable, some form of professional "discipline" is
appropriate, even essential. The professional responsibilities must be enforceable
despite the influence of the First Amendment. Necessarily, the enforceability of
such professional duties requires a legal doctrine that does not define a professor's
rights to academic speech - that is, classroom teaching and publications in
academic journals - with the same scope, methods, and substance as the rights of
every citizen to argue, protest, and campaign in the public forums of the com-
munity.
The door to striking the balance between academic freedom and academic
professionalism can be found in the "the unfolding law of employment."4' Indeed,
this conception of balance between academic freedom and academic professionalism
fits well with the approach of the United States Supreme Court in Pickering v.
Board of Education," and subsequent limitations and revisions of doctrine in
Connick v. Myers.43
III. Pickering, Connick, and Waters: The First Amendment and Public Employee
Speech in the Workplace
A. The Relic: The Right-Privilege Dichotomy
First Amendment protection for public employee speech in the workplace is a
recent development in the law. Until the middle of the twentieth century, the courts
viewed public employment as a privilege that could be granted or withdrawn
without any consideration of possible First Amendment consequences." Public
employment was viewed as a privilege, not a right, and anyone who accepted public
employment was deemed to have accepted the attendant limitations on their First
Amendment rights in the workplace.45
39. Id.
40. See Olivas, supra note 5, at 1844-45.
41. Matthew W. Finkin, "A Higher Order of Liberty in the Workplace" Academic Freedom and
Tenure in the Vortex of Employment Practices and the Law, LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1990,
at 379; see also Olivas, supra note 5, at 1839.
42. 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
43. 461 U.S. 138 (1983); see Finldn, supra note 41, at 368; Olivas, supra note 5, at 1839.
44. See, e.g., Mark Coven, The First Amendment Rights of Policymaking Public Employees, 12
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 559,563 (1977); 1 C. LABATr, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND
SERVANT § 299, at 930 (1913).
45. Mark Coven, The First Amendment Rights of Policymaking Public Employees, 12 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 559, 563 (1977); 1 C. LABATT, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT
§ 299, at 930 (1913).
1997]
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The classic articulation of this doctrine, known as the right-privilege dichotomy,
was fashioned by Justice Holmes, while sitting on the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts. In a case involving the termination of a policeman for his political
activities, he stated that "[a policeman] may have a constitutional right to talk
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman."' He went on to
state: "There are few employments for hire in which the servant does not agree to
suspend his constitutional right of free speech as well as of idleness by the implied
terms of his contract. The servant cannot complain, as he takes the employment on
the terms which are offered him."'47 These words of Justice Holmes reflected an
understanding that, when the government acted in the same role as a private
employer, the government's actions were not constrained by First Amendment
concerns. In such roles, traditional master-servant law governed the relationship and
the employee was required to honor the government employer's demands without
question.4
As recently as 1952, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the right-privilege
distinction. In Adler v. Board of Education,49 the Court upheld a New York law
that denied civil service and educational system employment to anyone advocating,
or belonging to, any organization supporting the violent overthrow of the
government. The Court upheld the distinction, announcing that if public employees
"do not choose to work on such terms, they are at liberty to retain their beliefs and
associations and go elsewhere.""0 Clearly, the employer's interests were fully
served by the rights-privileges distinction. An employer needed only to demonstrate
that his actions were neither arbitrary nor capricious.
It was not until 1967, against the backdrop of anticommunist hysteria, ignited by
the Korean War and fueled by McCarthyism,51 that the right-privilege distinction
was fully repudiated by the United States Supreme Court. In Keyishian v. Board of
Regents,"2 the Court found unconstitutional a provision of New York law,
previously upheld in Adler, which allowed the government to terminate professors
for knowingly belonging to a subversive organization. 3 Keyishian opened the door
for the application of the First Amendment to government employee speech in the
workplace.'
46. McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
47. Id. at 517-18.
48. See Mathew W. Finkin, Intramural Speech, Academic Freedom, and the First Amendment, 66
TEx. L. REv. 1323, 1328 (citing LABATr, supra note 44, at 930).
49. 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
50. Id. at 492.
51. Although the right-privilege distinction was repudiated during this era, other factors also
contributed to its demise. See William W. Van Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction
in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439, 1462-64 (1968).
52. 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
53. See id. at 609.
54. The end of the right-privilege distinction was completed only after decades of confusing
discussion by the Court. As early as 1926 in an economic due process case, the Court held that states
may not take away rights 'under the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable privilege."
Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593 (1926) (state law requiring
[Vol. 50:1
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B. The Pickering Test: Establishing Balancing
One year after Keyishian, the United States Supreme Court, in Pickering v. Board
of Education,55 again addressed a case involving a public employee's first
amendment rights, this time articulating the foundation of today's standard for
evaluating such cases. In Pickering, a high school teacher was terminated for
writing a letter to the local media. The letter, written in the wake of a recently
proposed tax increase, criticized the way in which the school board and the
superintendent handled past proposals to raise revenues for the district. 6 The Court
found that the dismissal violated the teacher's First Amendment rights.'
In arriving at this holding, the Court followed the Keyishian line of cases, as they
relate to the role of the public employee/citizen, along with the thrust of New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan," commenting that public employees do not lose all First
Amendment protection regarding matters of public concern upon accepting public
employment. 9 The Court stated that teachers do not "relinquish the First
Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters
of public interest in connection w.ith the operation of public schools in which they
work."' In so holding, the Court dealt the final, fatal blow to the right-privilege
distinction.
The Court then recognized the countervailing interests of the government/
employer, stating: "[T]he State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech
of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with
regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general."'" Upon identifying these
competing concerns, the Court announced the need to balance these interests,
stating: "[Tihe problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the interests
of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the
transportation company to perform as common carrier). In a wide variety of cases, the Court has struck
down government policies requiring waiver or surrender of rights as a precondition to governmental
benefits. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985); Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972) ("[Ihe Court has fully and finally rejected the wooden distinction
between 'rights' and 'privileges' that once seemed to govern the applicability of procedural due process
rights."); Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254, 264-66 (1970) (welfare receipt may not be conditioned on
waiver of due process rights); Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 680
(1990) ("It is rudimentary that the State cannot exact as the price of... special advantages the forfeiture
of First Amendment rights") (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also, e.g., Van Alstyne, supra note 51; Peter
Westen, The Rueful Rhetoric of "Rights", 33 UCLA L. REv. 977, 995-1008 (1986) ("rights" terminology
is ambiguous; the term may mean "entitlements" or it may mean "interests").
55. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
56. The letter at issue is reprinted in its entirety in the Appendix to the Opinion of the Court. See
id. at 575.
57. See id. at 574-75.
58. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
59. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 605-06 ("[Ihe theory that public
employment which may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how
unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected.")).
60. Id
61. Id.
1997]
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interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public.
services it performs through its employees.
62
The Court provided some limited guidance on how to evaluate the side of the
balancing test concerning the interest of the teacher as citizen. The Court
emphasized that whether a school district needs additional funds and how those
funds are allocated are matters of "legitimate public concern."' The employee-
interest side was also strengthened by the public context of the speech and by the
fact that the speech concerned a topic on which the speaker had an informed
opinion.'
On the other side of the balancing test, however, the Court was more specific.
The Court examined whether the teacher's action would interfere with either his
superior's ability to provide discipline or his own working relationship with his co-
workers.' The Court also noted that the teacher did not work with the board or the
superintendent in such a way that "personal loyalty and confidence are necessary to
their proper functioning."
The Court summarized its findings, phrasing its conclusion in the negative,
stating:
What we do have before us is a case in which a teacher hias made
erroneous public statements upon issues then currently the subject of
public attention, which are critical of his ultimate employer but which
neither are shown nor can be presumed to have in any way impeded the
teacher's proper performance of his daily duties in the classroom or to
have interfered with the regular operation of the schools generally.67
The opinion reveals that the primary inquiry on the employer side of the balancing
test relates to the impact on the institution, not the impact on anyone in his or her
personal capacity.'3 This delicate distinction is evidenced by a footnote to the
opinion in which the Court indicates that the impact on any individual is to be
accorded weight only to the extent that it impacts the working relationship.'
Finally, in determining the impact on the operation and efficiency of the school, the
Court looked to the actual result of the speech, instead of the perceived or intended
result at the time of the termination.0
In the wake of Keyishian, the Pickering Court faced the difficult decision between
the need for efficiency in the public workplace and the desire to protect cherished
individual First Amendment rights. Faced with this choice, the Court seems to draw
heavily upon the rationale employed by the Court in New York Times Co. v.
62. Id
63. Il at 571.
64. See id. at 571-72.
65. See id at 570.
66. Id
67. Id. at 572-73.
68. See id
69. See id at 570 n.3.
70. See id at 570-71.
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Sullivan.7 In New York Times Co., the Court recognized the importance of the
First Amendment in the context of alleged defamatory statements against public
officials.' New York Times Co. and its progeny established a clear standard that
a state cannot allow the recovery of damages by a public official in a defamation
case unless the public official can show that such statements were made with
knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard for their truth or falsity. On the
Pickering facts, Justice Marshall seems to follow New York Times Co. and apply
a "categorical balancing" or "definitional balancing."' It seems clear that although
the Court applied such a clear test on the facts before it, the Court contemplated
other factual circumstances which justify a case-by-case balancing. Thus, the Court
settled on a new test, a test that clearly rejected the bright line test afforded by the
right-privilege doctrine and one that is not quite the clear, categorical balancing of
New York Times Co.
This new standard clearly was an attempt to dampen the pendular swing caused
by Keyishian balancing the employee's First Amendment rights with the
government/employer's interest in efficiency. In the process, the Court created
considerable confusion, not just because it was a new pronouncement but because
the Court provided so little guidance as to the application of the test. As described
above, the Court provides almost no useful guidance for the employer or the
employee in weighing the competing interests. The Court admits as much, stating:
[W]e do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt to lay
down a general standard against which all such statements may be
judged. However, in the course of evaluating the conflicting claims of
First Amendment protection and the need for orderly school ad-
ministration in the context of this case, we shall indicate some of the
general lines along which an analysis of the controlling interests should
run.
74
Although the Court makes a noble effort at establishing a new test, the guidance
provided by the Court is of such a general nature that the relevant factors and their
appropriate weights cannot be adequately ascertained. The result is a balancing test
(which is naturally subjective) that provides little guidance or functional clarity.
C. The Connick Test. The Two-Step Analysis
In Connick v. Myers,75 the United States Supreme Court again addressed the
issue of the First Amendment rights of a public employee, this time in the context
71. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
72. See id. at 269.
73. Without particularity, Pickering seems to urge a test of judicial care, possibly "close scrutiny"
that distinguishes two situations: one, when government authority seeks to restrict the marketplace of
ideas (as seen by the Court in Pickering) or to protect itself from voters' awareness of criticism, and other
situations - not discussed until Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) and Waters v. Churchill 511
U.S. 661 (1994) - when the employer's interests are preeminent.
74.' Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569.
75. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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of employee speech criticizing the actions of an employer with whom the employee
had a direct working relationship. Connick narrowed First Amendment protection
for all government employees, including university professors. "Within a year of
Connick, college professors were consistently losing claims that they might have
won under the broader conception of protected activities in Pickering."76 Though
Connick did not overrule Pickering or its progeny, district courts had little doubt
about the meaning of the Supreme Court's revised approach:
A careful study of all these decisions leads to the inevitable conclusion
that the First Amendment in the employment context is now to be more
narrowly interpreted to give greater scope to the legitimate rights of
governmental entities as employers, and also to reduce the burdens on
the courts caused by the burgeoning of litigation initiated by the
decisions upon which plaintiff relies here. 7
In Connick, Sheila Myers, an Assistant District Attorney with five years
experience in the office, learned that she was to be transferred to a different division
of the criminal court system. She voiced her strong opposition to the transfer to
both the District Attorney and the First Assistant District Attorney." Despite her
efforts, she was transferred. On the day of her transfer, she again told the First
Assistant District Attorney of her reluctance to accept the transfer, as well as a
number of other concerns she had with the office. Upon being informed that it was
believed her concerns were not shared by others in the office, she stated that she
would do some research on the matter.79 The next day Myers prepared and
circulated a fourteen-question "questionnaire soliciting the views of her fellow staff
members concerning office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance
committee, the level of confidence in superiors, and whether employees felt
pressured to work in political campaigns."' On that day, Myers was terminated for
76. Olivas, supra note 5, at 1839.
77. Landrum v. Eastern Ky. Univ., 578 F. Supp. 241, 247 (E.D. Ky. 1984).
78. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 140.
79. See id. at 140-41.
80. Id. at 141. The questionnaire, reproduced as Appendix A in the opinion, stated:
PLEASE TAKE THE FEW MINUTES IT WILL REQUIRE TO FILL THIS OUT. YOU
CAN FREELY EXPRESS YOUR OPINION WITH ANONYMITY GUARANTEED.
1. How long have you been in Office?
2. Were you mov.ad as a result of the recent transfers?
3. Were the transfers as they effected [sic] you discussed with you by any superior prior
to the notice of tlem being posted? -
4. Do you think as a matter of public policy, they should have been? _
5. From your experience, do you feel office procedure regarding transfers has been fair?
6. Do you believe there is a rumor mill active in the office?
7. If so, how do you think it effects [sic] overall working performance of A.D.A.
personnel?
8. If so, how do you think it effects [sic] office morale? -
9. Do you generally first learn of office changes and developments through rumor? __
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refusing to accept the transfer and for insubordination by attempting a "mini-
insurrection."'"
The Connick Court expanded upon the Pickering test by establishing a two-step
analysis questioning whether the speech concerned a matter of "public concern" as
a threshold, discrete inquiry. First, to evaluate the speech's status as a matter of
public concern, the Court looked to see if the speech involved a "matter of political,
social, or other concern to the community."'2 Second, if the speech was determined
of public interest, then the court found a balancing of government/employer interests
contrasted with individual interests to be in order."
The Court hinged its analysis on Pickering, stating: "Pickering, its antecedents,
and its progeny lead us to conclude that if Myers' questionnaire cannot be fairly
characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern, it is unnecessary
for us to scrutinize the reasons for her discharge."' The Court elaborated, holding
that
when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public
concern, but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal
interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not
the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel
decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the
employee's behavior.'
Thus, the Court erected an important barrier between the public employee's free
speech interest and the interests of the government employer: public employee
speech should only be eligible to receive constitutional protection if it touches upon
a matter of public concern. To hold otherwise would eviscerate public, managerial
10. Do you have confidence in and would you rely on the word of:
Bridget Bane __
Fred Harper
Lindsay Larson
Joe Meyer
Dennis Waldron -
II. Do you ever feel pressured to work in political campaigns on behalf of office
supported candidates?
12. Do you feel a grievance committee would be worthwhile addition to the office
structure?_
13. How would you rate office morale?
14. Please feel free to express any comments or feelings you have. -
THANK YOU FOR YOUR COOPERATION IN THIS SURVEY.
Id. at 155.
81. Id. at 141.
82. If the employee expression is not deemed to be in the public interest, then "government officials
should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the
name of the First Amendment." Id. at 146.
83. See id. at 150-51.
84. Id. at 146.
85. Id. at 147 (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349-50 (1976)).
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control. Thus, through the public concern test, the Court preserves Pickering, and
confines protection to public discussion of public issues.
The Court provided further guidance on what is a matter of "public concern,"
indicating that the relevant inquiry is into the "content, form and context" of the
speech.' Because the questionnaire was not developed with the goal of educating
the public concerning the failure of the office to properly discharge its duty or seek
to reveal violations of the public trust, the Court found that none of the questions,
save one, addressed a matter of public concern. Notably, the questionnaire was
formed and circulated for the purpose of furthering a personal, internal grievance."
One question on the questionnaire, the question addressing whether employees
felt pressured to work on political campaigns, was found to have addressed a matter
of public concern, requiring a balancing of the relevant interests." In weighing the
government's interest in the efficient operation of the office, the Court agreed with
the lower court that it was essential for Assistant District Attorneys to maintain a
close working relationship with their superiors." The Court also noted that in cases
where a close working relationship is necessary, a great deal of deference should
be given to the employer's judgment.' Additional factors the Court considered
relevant were the time, place, and manner in which the questionnaire was
disseminated.' The Connick Court found particularly compelling the context in
which the dispute took place. Because the speech at issue was spoken pursuant to
a grievance concerning internal policy, the Court gave additional weight to the
employer's view that his authority to run the office had been jeopardized.'
The Court also established that with regard to the government/employer side of
the scale, the proper inquiry is into the employer's reasonable belief at the time of
the action, not to the actual result. The Court stated "[t]he limited First Amendment
interest involved here does not require that Connick tolerate action which he
reasonably believed would disrupt the office, undermine his authority, and destroy
close working relationships. " '
Connick fundamentally shifted the Pickering test in the government/employer's
favor, but provided little guidance to apply the test.9 First, while the Court
pronounced the public concern test as the threshold inquiry, the Court did not
effectively establish how balancing relates. As the dissent points out, this manner
86. Id. at 147-48.
87. See id. at 148.
88. See i&. at 149.
89. See id. at 151.
90. See id. at 151-52.
91. See id. at 152.
92. See id. at 153.
93. Id. at 154.
94. The Court reiterated the caveat issued in Pickering, stating, "Because of the enormous variety
of fact situations in which critical statements by... public employees may be thought by their
superiors ... to furnish grounds for dismissal, we do not deem it either appropriate or feasible to attempt
to lay down a general standard against which all such statements may be judged." Id. (quoting Pickering,
391 U.S. at 569).
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and context balancing clearly was part of the second step in the test, but not part
of the previous public concern determination."
Second, the Court found that the district court "erred in imposing an unduly
onerous burden on the State to justify Myers' discharge."' After determining that
Myers' speech was a matter of public concern, the district court believed that the
government's burden was to "clearly demonstrate" that the speech at issue
"substantially interfered" with official responsibilities.' The Court rejected the
district court's interpretation, instead adopting a much more amorphous standard.
The Court stated "that the State's burden in justifying a particular discharge varies
depending upon the nature of the employee's expression. Although such par-
ticularized balancing is difficult, the courts must reach the most appropriate possible
balance of the competing interests.""8
Finally, the Court placed added emphasis on the importance of the employer's
interest in the balancing test. The Court stated that "the Government, as an
employer, must have wide discretion and control over the management of its
personnel and internal affairs. This includes the prerogative to remove employees
whose conduct hinder efficient operation and to do so with dispatch."" The Court
continued to emphasize the importance of the employer's interest, indicating that,
"[w]hen close working relationships are essential to fulfilling public responsibilities,
a wide degree of deference to the employer's judgment is appropriate."'"
Adding even more confusion to the balancing test, the Court stated the following:
[We do not see the necessity for an employer to allow events to unfold
to the extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction of
working relationships is manifest before taking action. We caution that
a stronger showing may be necessary if the employee's speech more
substantially involved matters of public concern."
95. See id. at 159 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent also takes issue with the distinction the
majority makes between the case at issue and Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 439
U.S. 410 (1970). In Givhan, the Court held that First Amendment protection applies when a public
employee arranges to communicate privately with his employer rather than to express his views publicly.
See Givhan, 439 U.S. at 413. Givhan involved an employee's statements concerning the school district's
allegedly racially discriminatory policies. In Connick, the dissent criticizes the majority for distinguishing
Givhan from the case at issue on the public concern test by stating that in Givhan the speech protesting
racial discrimination is "inherently of public concern." Connick, 461 U.S. at 159 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.8). The dissent criticized the majority for effectively creating "two
classes of speech of public concern: statements 'of public import' because of their content, form, and
context, and statements that, by virtue of their subject matter, are 'inherently of public concern."' Id. at
159-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent believes that "whether a particular statement by a public
employee is addressed to a subject of public concern does not depend on where it was said or why." Id.
at 160 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
96. Connick, 461 U.S. at 149-50.
97. Id. at 150.
98. Id
99. Id. at 151 (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., separate opinion)).
100. Id. at 151-52.
101. Id at 152.
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Thus, it seems the Court created a further complicating step in the process. Even
after determining if the speech at issue involves a matter of public concern, the
second step, the balancing test, is dependant upon how "substantial" the matter of
public concern is. This further complicates an already unpredictable test.
Nevertheless, the Connick two-step analysis creates a reasonable framework from
which to evaluate a public employee's First Amendment rights. In the higher
education context, the test could be used to appropriately consider professorial
considerations, such as academic freedom, in the balance, without allowing such
considerations to be used as a bar to reasonable managerial enforcement of
professional norms (discussed infta).'"
D. Waters v. Churchill: Another Layer
In 1994, in Water, v. Churchill, 3 the United States Supreme Court again dealt
with public employee speech in the workplace. In this plurality opinion, the Court
significantly enhanced the weight to be accorded the government employer's interest.
In what appears to be an effort to protect against the employer's ability to avoid
constitutional scrutiny by a mere invocation of "disruption," the Court created a new
procedural requirement that falls short of the task.
In Waters, the plaintiff was terminated from her job as a nurse at a public
hospital because of statements she allegedly made to Perkins-Graham, her co-
worker, during a work break. Despite considerable dispute over what was actually
said during the conversation, 4 the hospital administrators terminated her without
either speaking with the plaintiff prior to termination or verifying her story."3
Thus, the Court was faced with a novel question: What level of inquiry is required
of the employer in determining the actual content of the speech?"
Justice O'Connor wrote the plurality opinion, first reaffirming the Pick-
eringlConnick standard and then adding a new due process requirement. Although
O'Connor claims to have adopted Connick, in fact, she significantly reinforced the
rationale behind the government/employer interest and increased the deference given
to this interest in the balancing test."° The plurality stated:
102. See discussion infra Part V.
103. 511 U.S. 661 (1994).
104. See id. at 665-65. The hospital administrators based their decision upon allegations of two
individuals who overheard the conversation. These individuals claimed that the plaintiff had tried to
convince Perkins-Graham not to take a transfer to another department by describing how bad the
department was and that she had said "unkind and inappropriate negative things about [the ad-
ministrators]." Id at 665. The plaintiff claimed that the conversation at issue primarily concerned a
training policy for nurses and other staffing policies that she felt "threatened to 'ruin' the hospital because
they 'seemed to be impeding nursing care."' Id. at 666.
105. The plaintiffs version of the story was corroborated by two individuals who overheard the
conversation; however, they were not interviewed by the hospital administration. See id.
106. See id. at 668.
107. See id. at 677-78.
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[C]onstitutional review of government employment decisions must rest
on different principles than review of speech restraints imposed by the
government as sovereign ....
• .. [T]he extra power the government has in this area comes from
the nature of the government's mission as employer. Government
agencies are charged by law with doing particular tasks. Agencies hire
employees to help do those tasks as effectively and efficiently as
possible. When someone who is paid a salary so that she will contribute
to an agency's effective operation begins to do or say things that detract
from the agency's effective operation, the government employer must
have some power to restrain her. The reason the governor may ... fire
the deputy is not that this dismissal would somehow be narrowly
tailored to a compelling government interest. It is that the governor and
the governor's staff have a job to do, and the governor justifiably feels
that a quieter subordinate would allow them to do this job more
effectively.
The key to First Amendment analysis of government employment
decisions, then, is this: The government's interest in achieving its goals
as effectively and efficiently as possible is elevated from a relatively
subordinate interest when it acts as sovereign to a significant one when
it acts as employer. The government cannot restrict the speech of the
public at large just in the name of efficiency. But where the government
is employing someone for the very purpose of effectively achieving its
goals, such restrictions may well be appropriate."'
Although not going as far as Justice Holmes did when defining the right-privilege
doctrine, Waters seems to have adopted a similar general philosophy towards free
speech rights in the workplace.
The plurality opinion then went on to adopt a new due process right. If this due
process right was intended to prevent an employer from avoiding constitutional
concerns by a mere claim of "threatened disruption," then O'Connor did not achieve
her goal. The plurality concluded that an employer must use reasonable procedures
to determine whether the First Amendment protected the speech at issue." Thus,
the plurality effectively required the employer to engage in a reasonable inquiry into
the speech using a PickeringlConnick standard, before the employer may avoid
liability for transgressing the First Amendment."' Any burdens relieved by
O'Connor's deference are replaced by the employer's new, more uncertain duties
created by this novel procedural protection."
As part of the Court's evaluation of the employer's inquiry, the plurality then
questioned whether the PickeringlConnick test should be applied to what the
employer believed was said, or to what the finder of fact determines was actually
108. Id. at 674-75.
109. See id. at 677.
110. See id.
I11. See id. at 686-94 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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said. The Court decided the relevant inquiry was into what the employer believed,
but only if that belief was reasonable. The plurality announced: "It is necessary that
the decision maker reach its conclusion about what was said in good faith, rather
than as a pretext; but it does not follow that good faith is sufficient." ' The
plurality concluded that a supervisor must make a reasonable inquiry into what was
actually said before dismissing an employee for speech that may implicate First
Amendment protection."' The Court tautologically added, "[o]nly -procedures
outside the range of what a reasonable manager would use may be condemned as
unreasonable.""'
Justice Scalia, joined by Kennedy and Thomas, concurred in the judgment, but
took issue with the new procedural requirement. He castigated O'Connor for
creating not just a new procedural protection for an established First Amendment
right, but a wholly new First Amendment right."5 Scalia interpreted the opinion
to change the nature of the government employer's First Amendment liability in this
area from one based upon an intentional wrong to liability based upon
negligence."6 Scalia asserted that the "pretext" analysis (which was the standard
before Waters) affords the appropriate level of protection when determining if First
Amendment protection attaches to employee speech in the workplace when the
employee does not have a property interest in his position."7
Justice Stevens' dissent, which was joined by Justice Blackman, portrays the
plurality's "reasonable belief' requirement as subterfuge, attempting to conceal an
employer friendly device. Stevens maintained that the requirement allows for the
deprivation of an employee's First Amendment right if termination is based merely
upon an employer's "reasonable mistake.""' He asserts that the "reasonable belief'
standard "provides less protection for a fundamental constitutional right than the law
ordinarily provides for less exalted rights, including contractual and statutory rights
applicable in the private sector.""' 9 Stevens believes that facts upon which the
PickeringlConnick test should be applied are "what the trier of fact ultimately
determines to have been said."''
Beyond requiring greater deference to government employer's interest, Waters
creates more confusion than clarity. By adding a wholly new, ill-defined layer of
procedure to the analysis, Waters further frustrated the confused contours of the
public employee free speech test by eroding the minimal pragmatic guidance
previously provided by Connick.12' Scalia addressed this concern, and chided
112. Id. at 677.
113. See id. at 677.
114. Id. at 678. '
115. See id. at 686 (Scalia, J., concurring).
116. See id. at 688-89 (Scalia, J., concurring).
117. See id. at 690 (Scalia, J., concurring).
118. IL at 698 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 695 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
120. IL at 697 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Waters, 511 U.S. at 664).
121. Not discussed is the usual confusion caused by a plurality opinion in an area where circuits
and states have applied differing standards.
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O'Connor for "provid[ing] more questions than answers, subjecting public employers
to intolerable legal uncertainty."'" Addressing the new procedural requirement,
Scalia asserted that "[diespite the difficulties courts already encounter in distin-
guishing between protected and unprotected speech and in determining whether
speech pertains to a matter of public concern, Justice O'Connor creates yet another
speech-related puzzlement that government employers, judges and juries must
struggle to solve."'" O'Connor provides no guidance on what a "reasonable
supervisor" would base her judgment as to whether "there is a substantial likelihood
that what was actually said was protected."'24 It is not clear whether the open
questions that flow from O'Connor's broad pronouncement are to be answered by
judge or jury. Unanswered also is the question of what consequences flow from a
determination -that the employer's investigation was unreasonable. 2 s This new
layer of confusion compounds the mountain of questions already confronting any
court, any employee, or any employer attempting to determine what rights a public
employee might have to free speech in the workplace. Justice Scalia summarized
this conundrum well, stating "[wie will spend decades trying to improvise the limits
of this new First Amendment procedure that is unmentioned in text and unformed
by tradition. It seems to me clear that game is not worth the candle.. .. ""
One might infer that in the wake of Waters, the prospect of an enforceable First
Amendment speech right in the public workplace rests on a weak foundation.
However, because the pattern of cases has been so variable and the holdings so
intensely fact-specific, any such conclusions are speculative at best. This is borne
out through an examination of two post-Waters cases.
IV. A Tale of Two Cases
The confusion wrought by Pickering and its progeny is best illustrated by an
examination of two recent cases that have attempted to apply the appropriate test.
122. Id. at 692 (Scalia, J., concurring).
123. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
124. Id.
125. Justice Scalia states that
O'Connor does not reveal what the remedy for this violation is to be. There are various
possibilities: One could say that the discharge without observance of the constitutionally
requisite procedures is invalid, and must be set aside unless and until those procedures are
complied with. Alternatively, one could charge the employer who failed to conduct a
reasonable investigation with knowledge of the protected speech that ajury later finds -
producing a sort of constructive retaliatory discharge, and entitling the employee to full
reinstatement and damages. Or alternatively again, the jury could be required to determine
what information a reasonable investigation would have turned up, and then to decide
whether it would have been permissible for the employer to fire the employee based on
that information.
Id. at 894 (Scalia, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 694 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Jeffries v. Harlestonlv and Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College" reflect the
varied results and clouded commentary that are a necessary and unfortunate by-
product of the Supreme Court's failure to provide adequate guidance in this area.
A. Jeffries I and JeJf-ries II
First in 1994 and then again on remand in 1995, the Second Circuit addressed a
case involving a public speech given by a Professor in which the Professor harshly
criticized the institution that employed him. The facts presented the Second Circuit
with an ideal opportunity to recognize both the importance and confines of academic
freedom while clearly establishing the necessary authority a public employer must
have to effectively function. Unfortunately, the court missed the opportunity, and
instead of providing function clarity, propagated the continued confusion of Waters.
Leonard Jeffries was a professor at City College (part of the City University of
New York (CUNY)), and was chairman of the Black Studies Department. After
being introduced as holding these titles, Jeffries delivered a speech at an African-
American cultural festival that was wholly unaffiliated with CUNY. Jeffries spoke
for more than an hour concerning racial and ethnic biases he perceived in the public
school curriculum. In the speech, Jeffries made several comments about Jews that
were "hateful and repugnant."'29
Jeffries' speech created a firestorm of controversy. His speech, initially broadcast
on an Albany televisions station, "received extensive media attention in the New
York City area."'3 This furor led Harleston, the President of City College, to
release a statement almost three weeks later that "condemn[ed] Jeffries for
undermining CUNY's policy of striving toward racial, ethnic and religious harmony,
and indicat[ed] that he would 'initiate a thorough review of this situation.""" The
Chancellor, Chair, and Vice Chair of the Board of Trustees of CUNY issued a press
release at the same time. They indicated that they would 'examine Professor
Jeffries' actions and statements and, if warranted .... pursue vigorously with City
College the remedies that may be appropriate .... ""'
At the October Board of Trustees meeting, Harleston, supported by the
Chancellor, recommended that Jeffries term as department chairman be limited to
a one-year term, instead of the customary three-year term. The Board approved the
recommendation. After the vote, Harleston wrote Jeffies of the Board's decision,
127. 21 F.3d 1238 (2d Cir.) (Jeffries 1), vacated mem., 115 S. Ct. 502 (1994), and rev'd, 52 F.3d
9 (2d Cir. 1995) (Jeffries I).
128. 92 F.3d 968 (gth Cir. 1996).
129. See Jeffries 1, 21 F.3d at 1242 ("For example, Jeffries launched several ad hominem invectives
at specific state and federal officials who supported the curriculum, calling one an 'ultimate, supreme,
sophisticated, debonair racist,' and a 'sophisticated, Texas Jew.' Jeffries also told his audience that Jews
had a history of oppressing blacks. He said that 'rich Jews' had financed the slave trade, and that Jews
and Mafia figu'res in Hollywood had conspired to 'put together a system of destruction of black people'
by portraying them negatively in films.").
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
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stating that the speech "threatened recruitment, fundraising, and CUNY's relationship
with the community."'" At the March 20, 1992, Board meeting, the Trustees
voted unanimously to replace Jeffries as chairman of the department."
At trial, the jury returned four special verdicts. Among these verdicts, the jury
found that the Board would not have reduced Jeffries' term as chairman but for the
speech; "5 that the defendant did not show that the speech "hampered the effective
and efficient operation of the Black Studies Department, the College, or the
University;"'36 and that defendant's actions were motivated by a reasonable
expectation that the speech would "cause the disruption of the effective and efficient
operation of the Black Studies Department, the College, or the University."'37
Based upon the answers to four special verdict questions, the trial court found that
Jeffries' speech substantially involved a matter of public concern and noted that the
jury had concluded that there was not interference with CUNY operations. The trial
court concluded that the plaintiffs interests outweighed CUNY's interests, and, thus,
that the defendants had violated Jeffries' First Amendment rights.'
In Jeffries I, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals adopted a Pickering-esque
approach: providing great deference to the right to free speech, requiring an actual
showing of disruption, and narrowly drawing the contours of what can be defined
as interference with operations. The court began its analysis by extolling the
importance of the First Amendment, even in the workplace. The court felt
compelled to invoke the seventy-five-year-old words of Justice Holmes, who in a
dissent, opined:
[W]e should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the
expression of opinions that we loath and believe to be fraught with
death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with
the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is
required to save the country.'39
After a perfunctory determination that Jeffries' speech substantially concerned
public issues,"4 the court turned to the balancing test. The court preordained its
conclusion by defining the balancing test in a way that almost completely prevented
any finding other than in favor of Jeffries. Drawing upon specific language in
Connick, the court strangulated the intention of the United States Supreme Court
and then extrapolated its conclusion to find in favor of Jeffries. Citing Connick for
authority, the court stated that, "[h]ow much interference the government must show
133. Il
134. Jeffries was replaced as chairman by Professor Edmund Gordon, retired chairman of Yale
University's African-American studies department. See id. at 1243.
135. See id. at 1243.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1243-44.
138. See id. at 1244.
139. Id. at 1245 (quoting Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)).
140. See id. at 1245.
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to justify sanctioning an employee for his speech will vary, depending on the degree
that the speech involved matters of public concern."'" Then the court relied upon
an earlier Second Circuit opinion to establish that if "the speech substantially
addressed public issues, the government must show the statements 'actually
undermined the effective and efficient operation' of the employee's department."'
The court then formulated a novel test, finding that "[b]ecause, as we held above,
Jeffries' speech substantially concerned public issues, the defendants shoulder the
weightier burden of showing that the speech caused substantial disruption at
CUNY.
43
The court found in favor of Jeffries because it believed the defendants did not
show the required substantial interference. The court recognized that "the
government generally has more discretion to sanction an employee who serves in
a 'confidential, policymaking, or public contact role' than one who performs
ministerial functions,"'" citing, parenthetically, that "the employee's responsibilities
determine whether his statement 'somehow undermines the mission of the public
employer. '" 4' Nevertheless, the court only paid lip-service to the important
employer interests at stake. The court ignored reality and found that department
chairs are "ministerial positions."'" The court then ended its analysis with a
conclusory finding:
In short, to rebut Jeffries' prima facie case, the defendants must show
substantial interference. We find that the defendants have provided
meager evidence at best that Jeffries' speech had any real disruptive
effect on CUNY operations, and thus, have fallen short of their
burden. 47
In reaching this conclusion, the court apparently ignored its finding earlier in its
opinion that "as evidenced by the ensuing uproar, its content affronted many who
heard it or, at least, heard about it.""' The court also recognized, but then failed
to consider that there was great publicity surrounding the speech for several days
and that Jeffries was recognized as a professor and departmental chair of the
College. Finally, the court gave no credence to the fact that as a departmental chair,
Jeffries was serving in an administrative capacity for the College and as such
carried more weight than an average professor to speak on behalf of the institution.
Even assuming arguendo that actual disruption must be shown, certainly the court
141. Id. at 1246 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 146-47). "If the speech only tangentially touched
on public issues, the government need not wait until 'the disruption of the office and the destruction of
working relationships is manifest' before taking action." Id. (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 152).
142. d (quoting Piesco v. City of New York, 933 F.2d 1149, 1159 (2d Cir. 1991)).
143. Id. (emphasis added).
144. l at 1247.
145. l (citing Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 390-91 (1987).
146. Id at 1247.
147. Id. at 1247.
148. Id. at 1245.
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has admitted to more than "meager evidence" of disruption. Clearly, the court failed
to give proper weight to the important employer interests at stake for the College.
One month after Jeffries I was decided, the Supreme Court spoke in Waters. In
light of Waters, the Supreme Court remanded Jeffries I for reconsideration.149 In
Jeffries II, ' the Second Circuit reversed its previous ruling.' While the holding
was correct, the rationale was flawed. The court predicated its reversal on their
mistaken belief "that the First Amendment protects a government employee who
speaks out on issues of public interest from censure by his employer unless the
speech actually disrupted the employer's operations."'52 The court then summarized
the test under Waters.
Waters permits a government employer to fire an employee for speaking
on a matter of public concern if: (1) the employer's prediction of
disruption is reasonable; (2) the potential disruptiveness is enough to
outweigh the value of the speech; and '(3) the employer took action
against the employee based on this disruption and not in retaliation for
the speech.'
The court refined the test, finding that "even when the speech is squarely on public
issues - and thus earns the greatest constitutional protection - Waters indicates
that the government's burden is to make a substantial showing of likely interference
and not an actual disruption.'
54
Although the court adequately described the Waters test, its application of the
facts to the law and the supporting rationale are conclusory and misguided. The
court accepted the jury's finding through special verdict that the defendants were
motivated by a "reasonable expectation" that the speech would harm CUNY. The
court accepted this conclusion despite the fact that in Jeffries I, the court found that
"the defendants ... provided meager evidence at best that Jeffries' speech had any
real disruptive effect on CUNY operations."'55 Although the court in Jeffries 1I
recognized the key is "reasonable belief' and not "actual effect," the two blur
together on the facts of this case as the action at issue, the vote of the Board to
limit the term of Jeffries' chairmanship, took place three months after the speech.
Presumably any harm to CUNY would have been evident within that three month
window. Thus, in this case, it seems there is no real difference between what was
a "reasonable expectation" of the effect of the speech and what actually occurred
or was occurring as a result of the speech. Therefore, it is difficult to harmonize the
court's conclusion in Jeffties 11 with its finding in Jeffries L
149. See Harleston v. Jeffries, 115 S. Ct. 502 (1994) (mem.).
150. Jeffries v. Harleston, 52 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 1995).
151. See id. at 13.
152. Id. at 12. The court noted that at the time of Jeffries I, "the strict actual interference
requirement reflected the law of the Second Circuit." Id.
153. Id. at 13.
154. Id.
155. Jeifries I, 21 F.3d at 1247.
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The court went on to hold, without any application of the facts, that "as a matter
of law, this potential disruptiveness was enough to outweigh whatever First
Amendment value [Jeffries' speech] might have had."'" Such a conclusory holding
is incredible considering that less than one year earlier the Jeffries I court had found
that the speech at issue involved "issues ... suffused with social and political
hues"' and that in Jeffries II the court found the issues "squarely involved issues
of public concern.""' The only guidance given by the court for this sea change
in the balancing was its recognition that the Waters plurality "emphasized that
greater deference must be given to the government when it acts as employer rather
than as sovereign."'5 Certainly, the court should have explained how the balance
of the interests changed so dramatically.
B. Cohen v. San Beniadino College
In Cohen v. San Bernadino Valley College,'" the Ninth Circuit confronted a
case in which a professor's classroom teaching tactics were measured against sexual
harassment guidelines. The facts of the case come close to providing a basis for the
worst caricatures and stereotypes of what professors may do when protected by
overbroad concepts of academic freedom. Cohen was a tenured professor teaching
English and Film Studies at the California community college. He apparently
enjoyed controversy. The district court described the professor's unusual teaching
method:
By his own admission, Cohen uses a confrontational teaching style
designed to shock his students and make them think and write about
controversial subjects. He assigns provocative essays such as Jonathan
Swift's "A Modest Proposal" and discusses subjects such as obscenity,
cannibalism, and consensual sex with children. At times, Cohen uses
vulgarities and profanity in the classroom. 6'
The professor used this style in a spring 1992 remedial English class, a prerequisite
to other college-level classes, much to the dismay of one female student:
One of the students ... became offended by Cohen's repeated focus
on topics of a sexual nature, his use of profanity and vulgarities, and by
his comments which she believed were directed intentionally at her and
some other female students in a humiliating and harassing manner ....
Cohen began a class discussion ... on the issue of pornography and
played the "devil's advocate" by asserting controversial viewpoints.
During classroom discussion on this subject, Cohen stated in class that
156. Jeffries H1, 52 F.3d at 13.
157. Jeffries 1, 21 F.3d at 1245.
158. Jeffries I1, 52 F.3d at 12.
159. ld. at 13.
160. 92 F.3d 968 (9tlh Cir. 1996).
161. Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College, 883 F. Supp. 1407, 1410 (C.D. Cal. 1995), rev'd in
part, 92 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 1996).
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he wrote for Hustler and Playboy, and he read some articles out loud in
class. Cohen concluded the class discussion by requiring his students to
write essays defining pornography. 62
In proceedings to enforce the college's sexual harassment policy, the accusing party
was required to show "verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature."'" The more
explicitly sexual the behavior, the better for the accuser. The student grievant was
able to present a quantity of evidence that impressed the district court. Also, in
college grievance proceedings, students from the professor's other classes had
testified that he had used similar sexually explicit subjects for his teaching method.
For example, the professor assigned his own article on pornography and film
criticism as mandatory reading. Typical of the material used to the professor's
disadvantage was his definition, in his article, of a "four-handkerchief movie,"
which was "a pornographic film ... extremely arousing to the male viewer.""
Also, though the litigation focused on the professor's classroom discussion, some
of the student's allegations went beyond the professor's behavior in class. Among
facts emphasized by the district court were the student's allegations that the
professor offered the complaining student a better grade "if she met him in a bar,"
that the professor "would look down her shirt, as well as the shirts of other female
students," and that the professor said the student 'was overreacting because she was
a woman."'1
6
The student stopped attending class. She refused to write the assigned paper on
pornography. She requested an alternative assignment. The professor refused to
give her one." So, she suffered an "F" grade for her scruples. After complaining
to the chair of the English Department, without obtaining relief, her next step was
to initiate a complaint alleging that the professor's conduct constituted sexual
harassment. She believed that the professor's remarks were directed at her and at
other female students. A college grievance committee agreed and disciplined
Professor Cohen."
The findings, conclusions, and recommendations of the grievance committee were
forwarded to the President of the college, who concluded that the professor had
violated the college's policy against sexual harassment." He found the professor
had engaged in "sexual harassment which had the effect of unreasonably interfering
with an individual's academic performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or
offensive work environment. '"69
Both the professor and student appealed to the college's governing board. The
board upheld the president and disciplined the professor. It ordered the professor
162. Id. at 1410 (footnote omitted).
163. Id. at 1410 n.4.
164. Id. at 1410 n. 3.
165. Id. at 1410.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id. at 1411.
169. Id.
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to submit his class syllabus for review by the chair of the department. He was
ordered to attend a sexual harassment seminar. And more generally, he was directed
to "[b]ecome sensitive to the particular needs and backgrounds of his students, and
to modify his teaching strategy when it becomes apparent that his techniques create
a climate which impedes the students' ability to learn."'70 He was warned that he
would be fired, if he did not comply.''
If the college was confident, it was probably because its policy" was identical
in form and substance to guidelines of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), save only for the fact that the college policy talked of a
learning environment, and the EEOC speaks to a work environment." Even more
comforting was the fact that the EEOC guidelines were twice upheld by unanimous
decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
It was the professor's turn to complain that his rights had been violated. He
turned to the federal courts. He filed a lawsuit based on allegations that the
college's discipline violated his freedom of speech.
Before the district court, the professor lost.' The court decided the case after
a bench trial on a stipulated record and written briefs.'76 According to the district
judge, the principal issue of the case was "whether a state college may limit the
classroom speech of its professors in order to prevent the creation of a hostile,
sexually discriminatory environment for its students."'" The court ruled "a state
college may do so, if the limitations involved are reasonable and narrowly tailored
to achieve the college's mission of effectively educating its students.'
M
The district court began its legal analysis by observing "[t]he concept of academic
freedom ... is more clearly established in academic literature than it is in the
courts."'" Indeed, the district judge continued, "[w]hile Supreme Court cases
contain strongly worded defenses of 'academic freedom,' their rhetoric is broader
170. Id.
171. See Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College, 92 F.3d 968, 971 (9th Cir. 1996).
172. The college policy read as follows.
Sexual harassment is defined as unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual
favors, and other vc rbal, written, or physical conduct of a sexual nature, it [sic] includes,
but is not limited to, circumstances in which: 1. Submission to such conduct is made
explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of a student's academic standing or status.
2. Such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's
academic performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive learning
environment. 3. Submission to or rejection of such conduct is used as the basis for
academic success or failure.
Id. at 971.
173. Compare supra note 172 with 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1996) (EEOC Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Sex).
174. See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57 (1986).
175. See Cohen, 883 F. Supp. at 1407.
176. See id. at 1409.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1409-10.
179. Id. at 1412.
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than their holdings."'' The court pointed to several lower court decisions that
"found substantial university control over grading policies and teaching
methods.'' The judge ruled:
[D]espite eloquent rhetoric on "academic freedom," the courts have
declined to cede all classroom control to teachers. The parameters of
academic freedom are not distinct, particularly in relation to the
potential conflict with a university's duty to ensure adequate education
of its students. What is clear, however, is that invocation of the
"academic freedom" doctrine does not adequately address the complex
issues presented by this case. For that reason, this Court declines to
hold that [the college's] discipline of [the professor] is precluded by
general notions of academic freedom under the First Amendment."
The district court then considered the application of cases discussing the First
Amendment rights of government employees; including Connick v. Myers." First,
the district court addressed the threshold test of Connick. Though "Cohen's profanity
is not speech on a matter of public concern,"'"M the judge admitted to difficulty and
doubt when considering a professor's classroom discussion of sexually explicit
topics.
[]t is less clear whether Cohen's comments on pornography and other
sexual topics constitute speech on a matter of public concern. The
determination of whether an employee's speech is a matter of public
concern is often a difficult one, for which there are few bright-line
tests ....
Based on this case law, the Court finds that the pornography topic
and the other sexually-oriented topics discussed in Cohen's classes are
matters of concern to the community and thus are topics of public
concern. The Court further finds that the record shows that the content
and form of Cohen's statements addressed these topics. Thus, Cohen's
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1414. See, e.g., Hillis v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 665 F.2d 547, 552-53 (5th Cir.
1982) (nontenured teacher could be terminated for refusing to give an unearned grade to a student);
Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705, 708-09 (6th Cir. 1973) (upholding university's decision to decline to
renew a nontenured teacher because of her pedagogical methods); Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 931-32
(7th Cir. 1972) (upholding university's decision to decline to renew a nontenured teacher because of the
teacher's refusal to conform to university-required course content and teaching approach); Peloza v.
Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 782 F. Supp. 1412, 1416 (C.D.Cal. 1992) (high school biology teacher has
no "constitutional right to conduct himself as a loose cannon in his classroom"), afjd in part and rev'd
in part on other grounds, 37 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 1994).
182. Cohen, 883 F. Supp. at 1414.
183. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
184. Cohen, 883 F. Supp. at 1416.
1997]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1997
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
commentary on those topics is commentary on a matter of public
concern.'8
The district court's analysis of the Connick balancing test led to the conclusion that
"the burden shifts to Defendants to show that their legitimate interests outweigh [the
professor's] First Amendment interests."'"
In applying this balancing test, the Court must consider the manner,
time, place, and context of the employee's expression .... The state's
burden in justifying the regulation varies according to the nature of the
employee's expression .... Essentially, the state's interest is based on
"the effective functioning of the public employer's enterprise."
The Court must consider the employer's interest in effectively
functioning, and whether that effective function is disrupted .... In so
determining the government's interest, the Court should consider
whether the statement at issue impairs discipline, co-worker relations,
or impedes the performance of the speaker's duties or the operation of
the enterprise .... If the speech at issue directly deals with issues of
public concern, a stronger showing of disruption is required. The
context of the situation determines how strong a showing must be
made .... A showing of real, not imagined disruption, is required."'
Applying the test and relevant precedent to the case at bar, the district court
concluded "[t]he College brings forth substantial, uncontroverted evidence showing
that the educational process was disrupted by [the professor's] focus on sexual topics
and teaching style. '"88 The court conceded the evidence of the professor's
effectiveness was mixed. Some students responded well; some did not. Though the
court noted that some of the professor's colleagues described him as "a gifted and
enthusiastic teacher,"'" the court concluded that "this evidence does not controvert
the evidence showing that the learning process for a number of students was
hampered by the hostile learning environment created by [the professor]."'"'
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit awarded victory, if not true vindication, to the
professor. In a short but unanimous opinion, the judges offered a brief discussion
of the facts and evidence. The court was unwilling to "define ... the precise
contours of the protection the First Amendment provides the classroom speech of
college professors."'' The judges offered no analysis of academic freedom and
no discussion of the Connick test. Instead, the appellate court concluded "the
185. Id. at 1416-17.
186. Id. at 1417.
187. Id. at 1417-18 (citations omitted).
188. Id. at 1418.
189. Id. at 1419.
190. Id.
191. Cohen v. San Bernardino Valley College, 92 F.3d 968, 971 (9th Cir. 1996).
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[sexual harassment] Policy's terms were unconstitutionally vague as applied to [the
professor]."'" Specifically, the court held,
officials of the College, on an entirely ad hoc basis, applied the Policy's
nebulous outer reaches to punish teaching methods that Cohen had used
for many years. Regardless of what the intentions of the officials of the
College may have been, the consequences of their actions can best be
described as a legalistic ambush.'
C. Jeffries and Cohen - Unbalanced
Jeffries I, Jeffries II, and Cohen demonstrate the results that flow from the failure
of the United States Supreme Court to provide an appropriate level of guidance on
how to apply the balancing test. Faced with unique factual situations and almost no
guidance on the balancing test, the lower courts have been forced to fill the vacuum.
The results and rationales reveal the struggle that they, and all other courts faced
with the same issue, encounter - how to balance important and conflicting interests
without knowing what interests should be considered, nor the weight to be accorded
to them.
As detailed above, Jeffries I and Jeffries 11 demonstrate a futile attempt to follow
Pickering and its progeny. It is unfortunate that the court in Jeffries 11 did not
engage in some explanation of its balancing of the relevant considerations, beyond
a conclusory comment that Waters put greater emphasis on the government's interest
when it acts as an employer. Although the correct result was reached by the court,
under Waters, it should have been reached after a thoughtful balancing of the
relevant considerations. On the employee interest side, the court should have stood
by its determination in Jeffries I, that Jeffries' speech involved matters of important
public concern and that because he was a professor, matters of academic freedom
were involved. On the employer side, the court was right to accord the
government/employer some degree of deference in managing its administration, but
should not have merely concluded that because there was such an interest, there was
no need to consider the employee's interests.
In Jeffries II, the court briefly addressed the issue of academic freedom.
Although the court correctly refused to weigh academic freedom in the equation, it
did so for the wrong reason. At the end of its opinion the court committed a
paragraph of commentary to address an argument by an amicus curiae." The
amicus asserted that Waters was not applicable because Jeffries, as a faculty
member, deserved greater First Amendment protection than did the nurse in Waters.
Although recognizing academic freedom as an important First Amendment concern,
the court concluded that Jeffries' academic freedom was not infringed upon. In
dicta, the court stated that "Jeffries is still a tenured professor at CUNY, and the
192. Id. at 971-72.
193. Id. at 972.
194. See Jeffries v. Harleston, 52 F.3d 9, 14-15 (2d Cir. 1995).
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defendants have not sought to silence him, or otherwise limit his access to the
'marketplace of ideas' in the classroom."'9s
The court is wrong to tie academic freedom to work only "in the classroom."
Concerns for academic freedom exist not just in the classroom but also to related
professional endeavors outside of the classroom. In this instance, Jeffries was
clearly speaking on matters directly related to his area of study and area of
instruction in his role as a professor of Black Studies at CUNY, and therefore
involved his academic freedom. The consideration of academic freedom should be
rejected in this case not because it is uninvolved but because the punishment does
not jeopardize his academic freedom as a tenured professor of Black Studies at
CUNY.
Jeffries I and Jeffries II reflect an inherent flaw in the PickeringlConnicklWaters
test - that the test looks only at the relevant interests, and not at the burden created
by the government imposed sanction. Possibly one reason the court did not explain
its balancing of the relevant interests in this case is that it does not produce the
correct outcome. Looking only at the interests considered under Pickering and its
progeny, the balance appears to weigh in favor of Jeffries. In the balance is the
interest of a professor's pursuit of academic freedom on the important social topic
in the very area of his expertise. Certainly, this must be a classic example of the
type of speech the First Amendment was meant to protect. The employer's interest
is rather nebulous, that of not injuring the revenues and reputation of the institution.
The decision of the district court in Cohen, detailed above, provides perhaps the
best articulation and analysis of the relevant considerations that can be divined from
the relevant Supreme Court decisions. The district court extracted the essence of the
balancing test and applied it appropriately, This understanding was made clear in
the following passage:
[Cjolleges and universities must have the power to require professors
to effectively educate all segments of the student population, including
those students unused to the rough and tumble of intellectual discussion.
If colleges and universities lack this power, each classroom becomes a
separate fiefdom in which the educational process is subject to
professorial whim. Universities must be able to ensure that the more
vulnerable as well as the more sophisticated students receive a suitable
education. The Supreme Court has clearly stated that the public
employer must be able to achieve its mission and avoid disruption of
the workplace. Within the educational context, the university's mission
is to effectively educate students, keeping in mind students' varying
backgrounds and sensitivities. Furthermore, the university has the right
to preclude disruption of this educational mission through the creation
of a hostile learning environment.1"
195. Id.
196. Cohen, 883 F. Supp. at 1419-20.
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After a thoughtful examination of the many complex considerations, including the
importance of "academic freedom," the district court rendered its holding:
Thus, even though Cohen's speech on the topic of pornography was
speech on a matter of public interest, the College's interest in effectively
educating its students outweighs Cohen's interest in focussing on sexual
topics in the classroom, to the extent that the university only requires
Cohen to warn potential students of his teaching style and topics.'"
Remarkably, the appellate court repudiated the district court's legal approach,
opting instead to reject the sexual harassment policy at issue under the "vagueness"
doctrine. In short, the appellate court deliberately left undecided and unexplained
what the college could do either to enforce its sexual harassment policy or
professional standards. By failing to discuss the district court's analysis that the
professor's teaching methods disrupted the educational mission, the circuit judges
did not confront, for example, whether the college is left vulnerable to lawsuits by
female students, who can recover money because of federal and state laws on sexual
harassment. By refusing to define "the precise contours" (or even the general
contours) of a professor's free speech rights, college and university faculty and
administrators cannot know whether the educational institution possesses the
ordinary authority of an employer to say to a professor that he is doing a poor job.
Likewise, the governing authorities of a college or university cannot know whether
they possess the power and authority to pursue academic or professional objectives.
For example, it is impossible to say whether a state college can do anything to act
on the belief that a professor should direct efforts to enlighten the students and to
elevate discourse, other than to offer an unenforceable opinion that if the professors
must teach about sex, then there is more value in Chaucer and Shakespeare than
Hustler and Playboy. The opinion says literally nothing about whether a college and
university can take action to insist that its literature classes teach from good novels
and fine poetry. In short, the decision upholds expressive liberty and academic
freedom without any apparent regard for college and university authority to possess
and enforce professional standards.
Thus, the opinions in Jeffries and Cohen reflect the failure of the present
balancing test. The lack of guidance by the Supreme Court has left the lower courts
adrift - clinging only to the sparse and inconsistent guidance provided by
Pickering and its progeny. By not providing adequate direction for the application
of the balancing test, the courts are left to speculate or, worse yet, allowed to
engage in outcome-based decision making. The effect is inconsistent results in the
courts and a lack of necessary guidance for both employees and employers to
understand their respective rights and obligations.
197. Ma. at 1420.
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V. Balancing: A Tentative Assessment of Relevant Factors
From the preceding discussion of Jeffries and Cohen, it should be apparent that
if balancing be inevitable, it may still be hazardous to both the causes of expressive
liberty and institutional academic autonomy, particularly if the analytical mechanism
is too facile.' A careful and probing judicial scrutiny need not thwart legitimate
and reasonable university action to perform its assigned educational mission.
Ultimately, we conclude that Professor Jeffries' removal as chair was constitutional,
but that the rhetoric of the Second Circuit was unduly destructive to principles of
academic liberty. Jeffries' rationale was wrong, or at least misleading and
dangerous, because a confused appellate court felt obliged to be too deferential: the
judges concluded that a reasonable governmental prediction of disruption was
sufficient to override a professor's free speech interests.
On the other hand, we conclude that in Cohen the Ninth Circuit should have
upheld the college's first, tentative, and restrained efforts to promote reasonable
professional standards. Indeed, it might be said that the Ninth Circuit's analysis was
only close scrutiny in superficial form; it was neither close nor scrutiny in
substance, because it was not careful and it shirked the most important problems.
Even if the decision to set aside the discipline in Cohen might be defensible, the
language and reasoning of the appellate court was wrong, or at least misleading and
dangerous. The appellate court felt free to ignore a careful and sensitive calculation
of professional considerations underlying the collective judgment of a public
college.
A. Relevant Consideration in Balancing
In both cases, the judges refused to define their thinking on a central issue of
importance - the meaning and scope of academic freedom, and its relation to
emerging standards of the First Amendment."w Because we are critical of the
two appellate courts' decisions - or at least their written explanations of their
decisions - to shirk responsibility for discussing the balancing test with more
care, it seems appropriate to discuss a tentative understanding of the appropriate
judicial inquiries.
To adapt Winston Churchill's famous description of democracy,' balancing is
the worst way to define constitutional principle, except for all of the others that
have been tried from time to time.' For most of America's history, lawyers and
198. See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
L.J. 943 (1987).
199. See, e.g., Stephen A. Newman, At Work in the Marketplace of Ideas: Academic Freedom, The
First Amendment, and Jeffries v. Harleston, 22 J.C. & U.L. 281 (1995) (concluding that in Jeffries,
"judges paid little attenticn to the issue of academic freedom, despite its importance to the nation's
academic community").
200. "[I]t has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government - except all those others
that have been tried from time to time." Winston S. Churchill, Speech Before the House of Commons
(Nov. 11, 1947), in 7 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: His COMPLErE SPEECHES, 1897-1963 at 7566 (Robert
Rhodes ed., 1974).
201. See W. William Hodes, Lord Brougham, The Dream Team, and Jury Nullification of the Third
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judges have believed that "[tihe rights which the First Amendment creates cannot
be established by any theoretical definition."' It was - and is - easy to assume
that "[t]he First Amendment is no coherent theory that points our way to unam-
biguous decisions."' "Absolute" First Amendment rights are an illusion.' It
is more realistic to see the law as "a series of compromises and accommodations
confronting us again and again with hard questions to which there is no certain
answer."' Balancing is the customary method of attempting to answer hard
questions without hope of certainty.'
Whatever strengths or weaknesses exist in the balancing approach, balancing in
First Amendment cases seems to be here to stay. Connick and Waters are two cases
that show that "[d]espite vituperative criticism of balancing as an unprincipled
technique for restricting speech, the Court never abandoned the methodology.
Indeed, ... the Court has resorted to balancing in First Amendment cases with
increasing frequency."' 7 What is not clear is whether the judicial scrutiny required
by these tests is to be deferential, or whether judges are expected to use a close
scrutiny. Federal court decisions after Connick provide evidence for almost any
reasonable prediction, which is a clear sign that current doctrine is muddled - or
even incoherent. As Professor Michael Olivas has pointed out, there are a wide
"variety of available paradigms and metaphors concerning academic freedom,"'
leaving great discretion in every analyst and judge to adopt their own. Professor
Olivas chose one that described well the unpredictable perceptions permitted by a
general balancing test:
I now adopt my own, that of the kaleidoscope, the wonderful child's toy
that - with a turn - reconstitutes one mosaic into another while using
the same shards of glass and refracted light. How one characterizes
classroom interactions is akin to turning a kaleidoscope in the light:
From one perspective it is a professor's autonomy to teach how she sees
Kind, 67 U. COLO. L. REv. 1075, 1091 & n.43 1996).
202. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 57 (1975).
203. Id.
204. Justice Felix Frankfurter offered one famous statement of the argument that absolutism is
impossible, in an infamous case that also demonstrates that balancing can deteriorate into improper
deference to a government's viewpoint discrimination.
Absolute rules ... lead to absolute exceptions, and such exceptions would eventually
corrode the rules. The demands of free speech in a democratic society... are better
served by candid and informed weighing of the competing interests, within the confines
of the judicial process, than by announcing dogmas too inflexible for the non-Euclidian
problems to be solved.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524-25 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
205. BICKEL, supra note 202, at 57.
206. See Aleinikoff, supra note 198, at 943 ("That some.., process [of balancing] must be a part
of any practical legal system is undeniable. But that should not blind us to the extreme danger of too
facile a use of "balancing"' in a system of justice.) (quoting Arthur Allen Leff, The Leff Dictionary of
Law: A Fragment, 94 YALE L.J. 1855, 2123-24 (1985)).
207. Id at 967 (footnote omitted).
208. Olivas, supra note 5, at 1855.
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fit; from another it is a student's right to learn in an environment free
of harassing behavior; from yet another it is the Dean's duty to ensure
that appropriate instruction is taking place; and finally, it may be the
accrediting agency's responsibility to maintain uniform standards across
institutions. Rotating the toy counterclockwise can produce a bullying
or insensitive professor, a hypersensitive or grade-grubbing student, a
high-handed or inattentive dean, an interfering legislature, or even an
outsider with some political axe to grind.'
A first step toward some analytical order is to develop a fair and comprehensive
list of relevant considerations. Such a list must not and will not be mistaken for a
formula. It will surely lack the predictability of a strict scrutiny test - particularly
the test "strict in theory, fatal in fact" designed for purposeful race
discrimination ° Hopefully, it will bear no resemblance to a rational basis test,
designed to leave the great multitude of public policy questions to the uncertainties
of the democratic process2 "
A reasonable reading of Connick leads to the idea that the announced test is a
separate and independent thing, not to be tied to any of the other distinctive
approaches to problems of free expression. And yet, when defining the balancing
test - and its components -judges and courts have no reason to ignore context.
A balancing test is surrounded by other tests and approaches and by consistent
warnings about the meaning of the First Amendment. A jurisprudence that relies so
heavily on a mechanical metaphor with no apparent content or values must turn that
metaphor into a manageable tool by borrowing content and values from the other
judge-made devices that seek to give meaning to the broad phrases of the
Constitution. In short, even though the Connick test is packaged as a separate
device for resolving government employment cases, the judgments of courts ought
to be influenced by emerging patterns of-judicial review in a wide variety of First
Amendment cases.212
B. Viewpoint Discrimination
In particular, courts ought not to feel obliged to strike the balance between
interests of the employer and the employee without regard to the lesson that
viewpoint discrimination is a sin worse than other forms of government action. The
presumptive unconstitutionality of viewpoint discrimination provides a useful
beginning for a list of relevant considerations. As the Court recognized in Pickering
209. Id. at 1855-56.
210. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 362-63 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting) (quoting Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term -
Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal
Protection," 86 HARV. L. 1,Ev. 1, 8 (1972)).
211. See, e.g., ALEXA!NDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 35-46 (1962).
212. Both Pickering and Connick seem to call for a balancing test in which the burden on the state
varies according to facts and circumstances, including the protected or unprotected nature of the
employee's speech. "Although such particularized balancing is difficult, the courts must reach the most
appropriate possible balanc- of the competing interests." Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983).
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and Connick, judicial review of public employment decisions based on the First
Amendment must be vigilant for those cases when government seeks to restrict the
marketplace of ideas or to impose a sovereign's will against unpopular opinions."'
The principle that an employee must address an issue of public concern is linked
to this idea, but this threshold requirement only does part of the job. Even if the
speaker addressed a matter of public concern, there is need to make a judgment
about government's motivation.
Viewpoint discrimination turns on thematic content, messages, or unpopular
opinions."" The Supreme Court has too often blurred the distinction between
viewpoint discrimination and content discrimination, particularly in many majority
opinions that break new doctrinal ground, but do so by offering compromise
language and studied ambiguities. For example, Justice Scalia was uncharacteris-
tically imprecise in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,"5 when he wrote: "The First
Amendment generally prevents government from proscribing speech or even
expressive conduct because of disapproval of the ideas expressed. Content-based
regulations are presumptively invalid."2 6 At times in the R.A.V. opinion, Justice
Scalia wrote of government's inability to restrict "the subjects the speech addres-
ses."'17 At other times, he seemed to distinguish carefully between different
subcategories of content discrimination, that is between topic or subject matterdiscrimination and viewpoint discrimination." Though many interpretations are
possible, Justice Scalia's probable concern was government action that places some
people at a disadvantage because of their opinions and ideologies. And so, in
R.A. V., he was careful to denounce a statute used to punish cross-burning, because
"[i]n its practical operation.., the ordinance goes even beyond mere content
discrimination, to actual viewpoint discrimination.""2 9 The city had "no such
213. See, e.g., Swank v. Smart, 898 F.2d 1247, 1250-51 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner,. J.) (First
Amendment not violated when a police officer was terminated because he picked up a young college
student and gave her a ride on the back of his motorcycle).
The purpose of the free-speech clause.., is to protect the market in ideas, broadly
understood as the public expression of ideas, narratives, concepts, imagery, opinions -
scientific, political, or aesthetic - to an audience whom the speaker seeks to inform,
edify, or entertain. Casual chit-chat between two persons or otherwise confined to a small
social group is unrelated, or largely so, to that marketplace, and is not protected. Such
conversation is important to its participants but not to the advancement of knowledge, the
transformation of taste, political change, cultural expression, and the other objectives,
values, and consequences of the speech that is protected by the First Amendment.
Id.
214. John Hart Ely argued for an "unprotected messages" approach, in which government would
have very narrow and well-defined authority to act when "the evil the state is seeking to avert is one that
is thought to arise from the particular dangers of the message being conveyed." ELY, supra note 22, at
I11. The term "viewpoint discrimination" seems to be the conventional label for this type of First
Amendment case.
215. 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
216. Id. at 382 (citations omitted).
217. Id. at 381.
218. See id. at 381-90.
219. Id. at 391.
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authority to license one side of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other
to follow Marquis of Queensberry Rules."''
In a more recent case concerning higher education, Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of the University of Virginia,2 the Court was clearer on the point. Justice
Kennedy, writing for the Court, observed a distinction between content
discrimination and viewpoint discrimination. "[D]iscrimination against one set of
views or ideas is but a subset or particular instance of the more general
phenomenon of content discrimination. And, it must be acknowledged, the
distinction is not a precise one. '  Thus, in Rosenberger, the Court held:
"Viewpoint discrimination is... an egregious form of content discrimination. The
government must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating
ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the
restriction."' n Though the Court has often blurred the distinction between content
and viewpoint discrimination, usually in cases when it was taking pains to avoid a
rule that would require aggrieved citizens to show intentiohal ideological bias, the
Rosenberger opinion sensibly approaches the matter. The danger to free speech at
a public university is extreme when governmental authorities act to restrict the
marketplace of ideas: "For the University, by regulation, to cast disapproval on
particular viewpoints of its students risks the suppression of free speech and creative
inquiry in one of the vital centers for the nation's intellectual life, its college and
university campuses.""
In short, in light of the most sensible interpretation of both R.A. V.'s ambiguities
and the explicit analysis of Rosenberger, one important inquiry is whether
governmental power or interference casts a "pall of orthodoxy"' over a profes-
sor's classroom expression. If so, a tougher scrutiny is appropriate; if not, there is
good reason to presume that federal courts should not interfere with the academic
autonomy of a college or university.' Another way to understand the point is to
220. Id. at 392.
221. 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
222. Id. at 2517.
223. Id. at 2516.
224. Id. at 2520. On this point, there seemed to be no disagreement, even from the dissenters in
Rosenberger.
The issue whether a distinction is based on viewpoint does not turn simply on whether
a government regulation happens to be applied to a speaker who seeks to advance a
particular viewpoint; the issue, of course, turns on whether the burden on speech is
explained by reference to viewpoint. As when deciding whether a speech restriction is
content-based or ontent-neutral, "[t]he government's purpose is the controlling
consideration."
Accordingly, the prohibition on viewpoint discrimination serves that important purpose
of the Free Speech Clause, which is to bar the government from skewing public debate.
Other things being eiuai, viewpoint discrimination occurs when government allows one
message while prohibiting the messages of those who can reasonably be expected to
respond.
Id. at 2548 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (citing and quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
225. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
226. See Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 830-31 (6th Cir. 1989) (administrators' unprofessional
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recall the famous maxim of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District,7 that students and teachers do not "shed their constitutional rights...
at the schoolhouse gate."'' In short, though expressive liberty is not quite the
same in the educational context, a core set of principles banning viewpoint
discrimination must be honored, as even the dissenting Justice Harlan observed in
Tinker. There ought to be no dispute that the First Amendment is sharply implicated
when a student or teacher can prove "that a particular school measure was motivated
by other than legitimate school concerns - for example, a desire to prohibit the
expression of an unpopular point of view, while permitting expression of the
dominant opinion."'' Justice Harlan may have been too restrictive in suggesting
that proof of ideological discrimination is the only way for a student to prevail, but
surely there should be no doubt that such proof always makes for a strong case that
the First Amendment has been violated."
However, a plaintiffs proof of viewpoint discrimination never ends the inquiry
or the case. In such cases, the federal courts usually deploy a categorical or
definitional balancing. The well-established way for government to justify viewpoint
discrimination would be to show that its action is directed solely against "well-
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of
which have never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem."'' Though
the list has been refined over the years, the unprotected categories of expression
include obscenity,"2 defamation," "fighting words,'" incitement to violence
or lawless activity," threats,' offers of bribery or criminal solicitation,237 per-
jury,2'2 fraud, 9 and perhaps a few others yet to be discovered.' Such forms
treatment of professor in class on one occasion "could not have resulted in a 'pall of orthodoxy' in the
classroom) (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)); see also Miles v. Denver
Pub. Sch., 944 F.2d 773, 779 (10th Cir. 1991) (adopting similar test).
227. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
228. Id. at 506.
229. Id. at 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
230. See also, e.g., Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973) (per curiam) ("[Mlere
dissemination of ideas - no matter how offensive to good taste - on a state university campus may
not be shut off in the name alone of 'conventions of decency."'); Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456, 460
(4th Cir. 1973) ("A college, acting 'as the instrumentality of the State, may not restrict speech ... simply
because it finds the views expressed by any group to be abhorrent."') (quoting Healy v. James, 408 U.S.
169, 187-88 (1972)). Cf. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 870-71 (1982) (narrow and partisan
decisions to remove books from library violate the First Amendment).
231. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
232. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
233. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
234. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
235. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
236. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 388 (discussing threats against the life of the President).
237. For discussion of possible formulae to define unprotected forms of expression, see WILLIAM
W. VAN ALSTYNE, INTERPRETATIONS OF Tim FIRST AMENDMENT 24-28 (1984).
238. See id.
239. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)
(commereial speech may be protected if not misleading or fraudulent).
240. See, e.g., VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 237, at 24-28.
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of expression are unprotected because they are "no essential part of any exposition
of ideas, and are of ... slight social value as a step to truth." '' Expression
deemed unprotected in the society at large is surely not somehow protected and
immune from sanction merely because it occurs in a university setting. In or out of
the higher education environment, government may punish a speaker because of the
dangers of the speaker's message but only when it falls into predefined categories
of unprotected expression. If a government can offer such proof, it should prevail.
Unless all lessons about punishing ideas, ideology, opinions, and viewpoints are to
be lost when government employment and academic employment is at issue, the
relatively principled approach of categorical balancing is necessary. In sum, the
federal courts must not ignore or forget the Supreme Court's repeated warnings
about viewpoint discrimination in cases like R.A.V. and Rosenberger when the
Pickering-Connick balancing tests are struck.
The basic danger of the Second Circuit's reasoning in the Jeffries litigation is that
the appellate court lost sight of the university's viewpoint discrimination as it
deferred to the fears of university administration about disruption. In the absence
of some other explanation, Jeffries appears to be a case in which the professor's
rights to think and to speak ought to have received the greatest protection and
solicitude from courts. There are alternative ways in which the Jeffries outcome
might have been justified. First, Jeffries was not dismissed from his tenured position
as a faculty member. Therefore, it might be argued that he did not suffer an undue
burden for views expregsed. 2 Second, he was dismissed as a departmental chair.
Despite the approach of the Second Circuit, it might be argued that a departmental
chair performs important leadership responsibilities.2" Institutional academic
autonomy requires that the academic decision makers have a range of discretion to
choose its leaders based upon subjective and controversial judgments about the
viewpoints and judgments of academicians." Unfortunately, as written, Jeffries
stands for none of these potentialities, but only as an example of how a balancing
test can be manipulated to approve almost any university decision to "becom[e]
subordinate to the immediately practical, to the shortsightedly expedient."2"
C. Professional Standards and Limits of Appropriate Content Review
If, as argued above, the Connick test need not lead to an unprincipled deference
in cases of viewpoint discrimination, what is the appropriate approach for cases in
which the court concludes, as a matter of fact, that the state interests and
motivations are viewpoint neutral, but still content discriminatory? In this category
of cases, the Connick approach seems to require a careful and sensitive weighing
241. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
242. See Newman, supra note 199, at 300-01; see also infra notes 256-61 and accompanying text.
243. See id. at 308-18, 329; Richard H. Hiers, New Restrictions on Academic Free Speech: Jeffries
v. Harleston II, 22 J.C. & U.L. 217, 222 (1995).
244. Cf. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214,225 (1985) (deference to academics'
substantive judgment is appropriate).
245. Frederick Jackson Turner, Pioneer Ideals and the State University, in FREDERICK JACKSON
TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY 245, 258-59 (1977 ed.).
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of competing interests without excessive deference and without rigid suspicion. This
standard reflects a possible contribution, perhaps the underlying purpose of the
Connick-Waters test applied to academic contexts, including academic speech. Some
content review is inevitable, but it must be careful and, ultimately, designed solely
to reinforce the professional responsibilities of the teacher and scholar -
responsibilities that have always been conceded to mark the outer boundaries,
however indistinct, of legitimate academic freedom.
Once it is clear that the perils of viewpoint discrimination are not present, a court
should give close scrutiny, not strict scrutiny, to the state's articulated justifications
for discipline. Close scrutiny should take the familiar path of "middle-tier" or
"intermediate" levels of review: (i) the burden of proof should remain on the state
or institution; (ii) the articulated interests should be viewpoint-neutral, professional
interests of a substantial nature; (iii) discipline should be premised on institutional
policies that effectively serve the articulated interests; (iv) the disciplinary policies
and apparatus should be carefully focused on achieving the articulated interests,
though not necessarily the only means of doing so. Justifications for institutional
action ought to be rooted in the long-proclaimed acknowledgement that professional
norms limit academic freedom. The varied considerations are many, but they must
be professionally driven. The "substantial" or "significant" university interest must
derive from the particular discipline or interdisciplinary framework of the professor's
expression. The university's regulation or sanction must have roots in standards and
processes that are professionally defined, professionally enforced, and professionally
reviewed.2' The uncertainties and ambiguities of this standard ought not to be
daunting, despite ambiguities and flexibilities, because a policy of academic self-
regulation 47 may need latitude to substitute a fair process for a substantive
standard that cannot be defined with precision.
Essentially, there is little need for anything new in the way of doctrine, when the
Pickering-Connick test is applied to a professor's academic speech or extracurricular
political statements: The need is for care, sensitivity, and a recognition that there
is legitimate room for professional self-regulation. Other types of content
discrimination often seek objectives not related to removing ideas from the public
square."3 The principle here is that government may "channel" or restrict (but not
246. "When judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision.... they
should show great respect for the faculty's professional judgment. Plainly, they may not override it unless
it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or
committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment." Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225.
247. To be sure, "[a]cademic freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited exchange
of ideas among teachers and students... but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous
decisionmaking by the academy itself." l at 226 n.12.
248. This test should be distinguished from the line of cases dealing with content-neutral time, place
and manner regulation of public forums. Government may adopt time, place and manner regulations that
are (i) content-neutral, (ii) justified by significant government interests, and (iii) narrowly tailored.
Government may restrict expression when it is reasonably incompatible or inconsistent with the purposes
for which public property is being used. Among examples of this test are governmental restrictions on
demonstrations near schools, courthouses, and abortion clinics; statutes requiring police permits for use
of parks or streets; regulations creating procedure for rental of convention centers or other public forums.
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prohibit) particular types or forms of expression - even if protected - in pursuit
of substantial or important government objectives, if the regulations are "narrowly
tailored" so as not to burden or disadvantage particular philosophies or viewpoints.
There are many examples governed by this test: regulations of political campaign
contributions,249 the ban on electioneering near polling place,' and the use of
zoning powers to restrict or contain sexually-oriented activity."
Any number of hypotheticals can be presented to demonstrate the need for limited
content-based discretion - or at least the need to discuss the idea more seriously.
Could an institution reward a professor who takes the view that professors should
not indoctrinate, while declining to reward a professor who uses the classroom
solely to inculcate students with his or her own views? Could an institution review
a professor's grading of examinations in light of a student's submission of evidence
that the student was punished for the student's viewpoint? Could an institution
review a professor's conduct in class or in discussions with a student against
reasonable standards of courtesy and civility? Could a mathematics professor
continue to teach at a university if the professor maintained that 2 + 2 = 5?
Could a scholar continue to enjoy the privilege of research and expression if the
scholar is found guilty of plagiarism? Is a university forced to forego whatever
advantages and benefits come from students' teaching evaluations? The argument
for a university's power or duty to review the behavior or words of a professor in
any of the preceding contexts rests on professional standards, but it still involves
content discrimination. Simply, a university must possess some real professional
latitude for dealing with such situations.
In this context, it is hard to explain why the college lost in the Cohen case. The
policies at issue were indisputably derived from professional norms. The key factual
finding of the college's investigation was that the professor had selected his teaching
strategy, at least in part, because it made life more difficult for women. The college
policy was both customary and as clear as possible: it incorporated the guidelines
of the EEOC that had been approved by two unanimous panels of United States
Supreme Court justices, despite claims that the guidelines were too vague. The
college discipline was imposed only after a careful, professional assessment.
Finally, the discrimination was mild; it amounted to a formal warning, linked with
249. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
250. See Burson v. Fireman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992).
251. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
252. See Olivas, supra note 5, at 1844-45:
[Alcademics still must adhere to professional standards in voicing their views.
This "professorial function" approach protects classroom utterances so long as they
meet professional standards and result from training, developed expertise, and scrupulous
care in presenting material. Conversely, a mathematician who insisted that 2+2=5 could
be fired for failing to meet professional measures of competence; an English teacher,
police file clerk, or telephone operator, though, could not be fired for holding such a
belief. While the calculus grows more complex for interdisciplinary fields, peer-review
journals and tenure committees routinely invoke the professional standard of care.
Professional standards are, in short, common in academic practice.
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a program of remediation. If a college is permitted to articulate and enforce
professional norms that a teacher may not violate, the institution ought to be
encouraged to develop a graduated scale of disciplinary steps, and the first step
ought not to be caricatured as a "legal ambush."
Truly content-neutral regulations probably will be litigated only infrequently. One
familiar pattern of cases focuses on content-neutral regulation for objectives
unrelated to suppression of expression. This is the so-called O'Brien test, after the
famous case in which the court upheld federal law banning wilful destruction of
draft cards. 3 When government regulates behavior for purposes unrelated to
suppression of expression, there is only an incidental interference with free speech.
Though a "weighing" process is involved, the presumption of constitutionality is not
yet rebutted and reasonable government action likely will be sustained.' A longer
line of cases makes the same basic point that regulatory laws of general ap-
plicability may not implicate genuine First Amendment concerns."S
D. Undue Burdens
As argued earlier, the outcome in Jeffries seems inconsistent with the prevailing
principle that viewpoint discrimination violates the core values of the First
Amendment. On the other hand, the decision to uphold the university's decision to
remove Jeffries from his position as departmental chair could be justified on an
alternative principle. The First Amendment is not a guarantee of complete and
perfect immunity particularly in a professional environment resting on professional
self-regulation: An individual is not protected from every consequence arising from
protected expression, but only from substantial interference or undue burdens.'
In Branzburg v. Hayes,' the Court recognized that "the First Amendment does
not invalidate every incidental burdening of the press that may result from the
enforcement of civil ... statutes of general applicability.""8 The same principle
must also apply to other institutions dedicated to First Amendment activity,
including colleges and universities. An individual who claims to have suffered a
loss of expressive liberty must demonstrate that government action poses a "threat
of substantial governmental encroachment upon important and traditional aspects of
individual freedom [that] is neither speculative nor remote."" As applied to
253. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
254. See Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961).
255. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (enforcement of contract); Barnes
v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991); Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969)
(antitrust laws); Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937) (labor laws).
256. See generally Newman, supra note 199.
257. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
258. Id. at 682.
259. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); see also Webster v. Reproductive
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490,530 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (only state regulations that are "undue
burdens" on the woman's right of privacy are unconstitutional); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
866 (1982) (powers of local school boards should be restricted only when "'basic constitutional values'
are 'sharply and directly implicate[d]"') (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968))
(alteration in original); Carey v. Population Servs. Intll, 431 U.S. 678, 688 n.5, 689 (1977) ("significant
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Jeffries, of great importance is the fact that the professor was not fired. Though he
was ultimately removed from a position of leadership, his status as a tenure faculty
member was not impaired. It is sensible for a university to create a balanced
arrangement in which an academic has tenure as a faculty member, but serves in a
leadership position that is more accountable to institutional control.' To be sure,
rendering the professor accountable to a university or an academic unit for failures
of leadership requires some latitude for what might be described as a content-
discriminatory judgment about the leader's words. 6' But just as surely, the
decision to limit his tenure as chairman was not a real intrusion into the traditional
concept of academic freedom. In Jeffries, the professor suffered no undue burden
because he continued to enjoy the benefits of academic freedom.
E. A Tentative Synthesis
Sorting through factors to be considered is easier than synthesizing the factors
into a formal test. Inevitably, a court's assessment of relevant considerations will
differ depending on facts and circumstances. And even the order and sequence of
analysis varies. Initially, however, an employee at a public institution of higher
education will need to satisfy the so-called threshold tests: first and most frequently
explained in the Connick-line of cases is whether the instructor has addressed a
matter of public concern. In addition to this inquiry, a court might reasonably ask
whether the instructor has suffered an "undue burden" or a substantial penalty for
academic speech. Unless a court reaches an affirmative answer to both inquiries,
almost certainly a First Amendment clain will not and ought not to prevail.
Next, the court must undertake a subjective inquiry. The court must determine
the government's motivation: What has government done and why? The answer to
this question must be a candid and careful assessment of the government's interests;
also, the answer should serve to categorize the case as either viewpoint
discrimination, content discrimination, or viewpoint-neutral and content-neutral
regulation. As in all other civil liberties cases, this categorization process is decisive
in determining the level of judicial scrutiny and skepticism.
Only at this point should a court turn to the metaphorical weight scales implicit
in the Connick-Pickering balancing test. The substantiality of government
objectives, the effectiveness of its strategies, the availability of alternatives and less
restrictive penalties, and even the precision and professionalism of its processes for
reaching a decision are all relevant and material considerations. Though scientific
exactitude is probably too much to ask, the preceding approach should amplify and
burden" on right of privacy); Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976) ("undue burden"); Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,220 (1972) ("A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless
offend the [First Amendnment's] requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free
exercise of religion."); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 545 (1963)
(First Amendment restricts state laws that "infringe substantially" on protected activity); Finkin, supra
note 6, at 850 ("[TJhe extent of constitutional protection depends upon the strength of the connection
between the particular invasion of autonomy and academic freedom.").
260. See Newman, svpra note 199, at 300-01, 319.
261. See id.
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give effect to fundamental principles that the Supreme Court never renounced even
in Connick, Waters, and other government employment cases: (i) a significant
impairment of First Amendment rights, particularly viewpoint discrimination, must
endure and survive exacting scrutiny; (ii) the government's interest advanced
must be paramount, which means the public interest gain must outweigh the loss of
protected individual rights;' and (iii) "the government must 'emplo[y] means
closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgement."'' "
VI. Conclusion
Principles of academic freedom and institutional academic autonomy collide when
the institution attempts to regulate the speech of professors. The United States
Supreme Court has addressed this conundrum only generally by recognizing
limitations on the free speech rights of public employees. Although the steps of the
balancing test articulated by the Court are facially straightforward, subsequent case
law has shown the guidance provided by the Court for the application of the test to
be confused and unworkable.
In sum, the Supreme Court should modify the Pickering-Connick balancing test
to include a threshold inquiry into whether the speaker has suffered an "undue
burden." Assuming the threshold inquiries are met, careful judicial scrutiny should
ensure that a government's viewpoint discrimination is narrowly focused only on
categories of unprotected expression or truly compelling considerations. But when
the institution acts to promote professional standards of higher education, federal
courts should show more respect and consideration for a public employer's interests
and mission. Such a modified "particularized balancing" should provide more
guidance to allow judges - and professors and administrators - to know the basic
contours of academic freedom.
262. See Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976).
263. See id.
264. Id. at 362-63 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976)) (alteration in original).
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